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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in denying 
Mr. Velarde's motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
TEXT OF STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-ll(e) (1982 and Supp. 1986) 
provides: 
(e) The court . . . shall not accept such a 
[guilty] plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by entering 
the plea he waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands 
the nature and elements of the offense to 
which he is entering the plea; that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence that may be 
imposed upon him for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a 
result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement and if so, what agreement has been 
reached. 
v 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney 
or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser 
included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the same shall be approved by the court. 
If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by 
the court/ the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
vi 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(b ) (1953 as amended) and §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1986) 
whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a conviction and final judgment 
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
Mr. Velarde pled guilty to a third degree felony and thereafter moved 
to withdraw his guilty plea. The Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denied 
defendant's motion; this appeal arises from the denial of that motion. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JERRY LEE VELARDE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880211-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 24, 1984, appellant/defendant JERRY LEE 
VELARDE pled guilty to Attempted Mayhem, a third degree felony. 
Mr. Velarde thereafter moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Judge 
Raymond S. Uno denied that motion after hearings held on August 31, 
1987; February 8, 1988; and September 12, 1988. Mr. Velarde appeals 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 24, 1984, Mr. Velarde pled guilty to Attempted 
Mayhem, a third degree felony (R. 16-18). At the time he entered 
his plea, he had been convicted of second degree homicide, a first 
degree felony, and sentenced to serve five years to life at the Utah 
State Prison (Transcript of Hearing held August 31, 1987, 
hereinafter TA, at 10). 
Although Mr. Velarde had a defense to the charge of 
Mayhem, he pled guilty because he believed it would have little 
impact on the amount of time he would serve in prison since he was 
already serving five years to life on the murder conviction 
(TA. 8, 11). On December 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
Mr. Velarde's murder conviction and he subsequently pled guilty to 
Manslaughter (TA. 8). 
Thereafter, Mr. Velarde moved to withdraw his plea of 
guilty to Attempted Mayhem based on his incorrect understanding of 
the consequences of that plea and the trial judge's failure to 
comply with Utah Code Ann, §77-35-ll(e) and the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment in accepting that plea. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Velarde's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The guilty plea was taken in violation o 
due process and Rule 11(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (1982 
and Supp. 1986). Furthermore, the plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily made since Mr. Velarde did not 
understand its consequences. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IS 
DENYING MR. VELARDE'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA, 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1953 as amended) permits a plea 
of guilty to be withdrawn upon good cause and with the leave of the 
court. An appellate court will reverse a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea "when it clearly appears the trial 
court has abused its discretion." State v. Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d 
92, 93 (Utah App. 1988) (pet. cert, denied) citing State v. 
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987). 
A. MR. VELARDE DID NOT KNOWINGLY, 
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS PLEA 
OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED MAYHEM. 
Good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea may be 
established by demonstrating that the plea was not made knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. See State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). In Gallegos, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea where the State's witness recanted her 
preliminary hearing testimony after the defendant entered his guilty 
plea. 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 
L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the United States Supreme Court clarified that 
the record must establish that a plea of guilty was intelligently 
and voluntarily made and the trial judge has the responsibility of 
making an adequate record of the defendant's waiver of his 
constitutional rights. Where the record does not disclose that the 
defendant intelligently and voluntarily entered his guilty plea, the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal 
constitution is violated. 
For a guilty plea to be made knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently, the defendant must understand the nature of the 
charge against him, the elements of the crime charged, the 
relationship of the law to the facts, and the possible consequences 
of the guilty plea. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
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1987). In State v. Cutler, 590 P.2d 444 (Ariz. 1979), the Arizona 
Supreme Court delineated the components of an adequate plea: 
For a plea to be intelligently made, a defendant 
must thoroughly understand its consequences. 
Moreover, in order for a plea to be deemed 
voluntary, the defendant must be aware of its 
ramifications and must be apprised of the range of 
sentence that he could face and of the rights he 
will forfeit. Therefore, if the defendant does 
not have a proper understanding of what can happen 
as a result of his plea, it is not voluntarily 
made and is void. 
_Id. at 445-6. 
In determining whether the defendant understood the 
consequences of entering a plea of guilty to a charge, courts often 
consider whether a defendant understood the minimum and maximum 
possible penalty and the potential for consecutive sentences if the 
defendant had been convicted of another crime. See e.g. 
Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d at 95. 
In State v. Copeland, No. 860491, slip op. (Utah 
December 6, 1988), the Utah Supreme Court vacated the defendant's 
sentence and remanded the case to the trial court in part for 
additional findings regarding the defendant's guilty plea. In 
Copeland, the defendant claimed that he misunderstood the basis of 
the State's sentencing recommendation. The Copeland court quoted 
the United States Supreme Court holding in Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742 (1970) at 13: 
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of 
the direct consequences, including the actual 
value of any commitments made to him by the court, 
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless 
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harrassment), misrepresentation 
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(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), 
or perhaps by promises that are by their nature 
improper as having no proper relationship to the 
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). 
The court then cited the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975), 
and concluded "Brady and Hammond require that in order for a plea to 
be voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the 
nature and value of any promises made to him." Copeland, slip op. 
at 14. Because the nature of the State's recommendation and the 
defendant's understanding regarding that recommendation were not 
clear, the court remanded the case with instructions that the 
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea under certain 
circumstances. 
In the instant case, Mr. Velarde did not understand the 
consequences of his guilty plea and therefore the plea was not 
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. When Mr. Velarde 
entered the guilty plea, he understood that the conviction would 
have little impact on the time he spent in prison since he was 
already serving a sentence of five years to life for a second degree 
murder conviction. Believing that the sentence of zero to five 
years would not significantly affect the amount of time he spent in 
prison, Mr. Velarde pled guilty even though he had a defense to the 
charge. 
When Mr. Velarde's murder conviction was reversed, the 
basis for entering the guilty plea to Attempted Mayhem was removed 
and Mr. Velarde's understanding of the consequences of his guilty 
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plea proved to be incorrect. Hence, Mr. Velarde's plea was not made 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, in violation of the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal 
constitution and Rule 11(e), and the trial court abused its 
discretion in not permitting him to withdraw the plea. 
Furthermore, the policy of the Board of Pardons changed 
so that Mr. Velarde's understanding of the consequences of entering 
his plea was erroneous (TA. 9-10). 
B. THE GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-ll(e) (1982 AND SUPP. 
1986). 
Where a plea was entered in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-ll(e) (1982 and Supp. 1986), good cause may exist for 
withdrawal of that plea. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987); Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d at 95. Rule 11(e) outlines the 
procedure to be followed by a trial court in accepting a guilty 
plea. It provides: 
(e) The court . . . shall not accept such a 
[guilty] plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial and to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he 
waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
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doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence that may be 
imposed upon him for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a 
result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement and if so, what agreement has been 
reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney 
or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser 
included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the same shall be approved by the court. 
If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by 
the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
In Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and its 
companion case, Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed the record as a whole to determine whether 
the trial court accepted the guilty pleas in violation of Rule 
11(e). The test for determining whether the rule was violated was 
to consider whether the record as a whole "affirmatively establishes 
that the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the rights he was 
waiving . . ." Warner, 709 P.2d at 310; Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311. 
In both cases, the trial judge questioned the defendant to determine 
whether the plea was being made intelligently and voluntarily but 
failed to ask specifically whether the defendant waived his right 
against self-incrimination. In each case, the Court determined that 
the record as a whole established that the defendant understood the 
rights he was waiving and the consequences of his plea. 
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In State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Brooks and Warner that the 
record as a whole must be reviewed to determine whether the plea was 
taken in violation of Rule 11(e). I^d. at 405. 
In Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court outlined "a statement 
of law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts in 
this state . . ." Ld. at 1312. The Court pointed out that n[r]ule 
11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a 
guilty plea is entered." j[d at 1312. The Court emphasized that 
trial judges cannot rely on defense counsel to ensure that a 
defendant understands the rights he is waiving and the consequences 
of entering a guilty plea but instead must review with the defendant 
any statement in an affidavit signed as part of the entry of the 
guilty plea, "question the defendant concerning his understanding of 
it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by §77-35-11 on the 
record before accepting the guilty plea. If the Court does not use 
an affidavit, the requirement set forth above and in §77-35-11 must 
still be followed and be on the record." _Ic3. at 1314. 
1. The Gibbons Standard Applies to This 
Case and Requires Reversal of the Trial 
Court's Denial of the Defendant's Motion 
to Withdraw the Guilty Plea. 
The trial judge seemed to deny the motion to withdraw in 
part based on his belief that Gibbons should not be applied 
retroactively to this case. (Transcript of Hearing held 
September 12, 1988 at 10.) (See Addendum A for transcript of 
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judge's ruling.) In Vasilacopolus, 756 P.2d at 94, this Court 
reached a similar conclusion, stating that "the strict Rule 11(e) 
compliance standard established under Gibbons in 1987 does not 
apply" to a case where the defendant entered his guilty plea prior 
to the Gibbons decision. Mr. Velarde respectfully requests that 
this Court reconsider its determination that Gibbons does not apply 
to guilty pleas entered prior to the date of the decision.1 
Rule 11(e) was in effect and controlled the acceptance of 
guilty pleas at the time Mr. Velarde pled guilty to Attempted 
Mayhem. Warner, Brooks and Miller contained very short discussions 
of the rule. In Gibbons, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to 
outline at length "a statement of the law concerning the taking of 
guilty pleas in all trial courts ..." Gibbons therefore explains 
and clarifies Rule 11(e). 
The responsibility of the trial judge to discuss with the 
defendant on the record the details of his constitutional rights and 
to obtain a valid affirmative waiver thereof on the record did not 
arise with the Gibbons decision. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 
242, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The requirement that the prosecution spread on the 
record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no 
constitutional innovation. 
1 The approach of the Utah Supreme Court when dealing 
with retroactivity issues is not clear. Although in Andrews v. 
Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 88-91 (Utah 1983) the Court embraced the "clear 
break" rule discussed in United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 
S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), the United States Supreme Court 
altered its position on retroactivity in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 
U.S. , 107 S.Ct. , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). Although Griffith 
is not controlling, it does provide guidance for the Utah Supreme 
Court on retroactivity issues. 
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Such a responsibility is also implicit in the language of Rule 11(e) 
and alluded to in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 
49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), which was decided well before the entry of 
the disputed guilty plea in this case. 
Finally, in both Brooks and Warner, the trial judge 
carefully examined appellant to insure that the plea was 
intelligently and voluntarily entered (Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311) or 
conducted a question and answer session which "followed the litany 
required by Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(e) . . ." Warner, 
709 P.2d at 310. Hence, pursuant to Rule 11(e), as applicable at 
the time the trial court accepted the plea in Mr. Velarde's case and 
the due process clause of the federal constitution, the trial judge 
had a responsibility to examine Mr. Velarde on the record to 
determine whether he understood his constitutional rights and 
voluntarily waived them and could not rely on defense counsel to 
carry out that responsibility. 
A review of Gibbons and the transcript of the hearing 
where the guilty plea was entered clarifies that the trial judge did 
not follow the dictates of Rule 11(e) in accepting Mr. Velarde's 
guilty plea and therefore good cause exists for allowing withdrawal 
of that plea. The Supreme Court clarified in Gibbons that a trial 
judge has the responsibility to discuss the specific rights being 
waived with the defendant on the record as well as the consequences 
of entering the plea and not rely on defense counsel to convey that 
information to a defendant. Gibbons, 740 P*2d at 1313. 
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In the present case, the trial judge did not question 
Mr. Velarde regarding his understanding of his rights and waiver 
thereof as required by Rule 11(e). Instead, he relied on defense 
counsel to explain to Mr. Velarde his constitutional rights and 
their waiver. The trial judge asked "[h]ave you gone over your 
constitutional rights and waiver thereof as set forth in your 
affidavit?" Transcript of plea hearing dated January 24, 1984 
(hereinafter TP) at 2. Entire transcript of hearing is contained in 
Addendum 3. 
When the defendant answered affirmatively, the judge 
asked n[d]o you understand those rights you are waiving?" Id. 
Hence, the trial judge made no attempt to discuss Mr. Velarde's 
constitutional rights with him or his waiver thereof, in violation 
of Rule 11(e) (3). 
Rule 11(e)(4) requires that the trial court make findings 
that "the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the plea." Gibbons clarifies that 
"the defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged 
and the relationship of the law to the facts." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 
1312. In the instant case, the trial judge made no attempt to 
ascertain whether Mr. Velarde understood the elements of the charge 
of Attempted Mayhem nor the relationship to the facts. Instead, the 
trial judge repeated from the statements contained in the amended 
Information, then asked Mr. Velarde for a plea. 
The Court: All right. To the included offense of 
Attempted Mayhem, a third-degree felony as I have 
described it to you, which occurred at 73 East 400 
South, in Salt lake County, State of Utah, on or 
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about March 4, 1983, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 105, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, in that you, Jerry Lee Velarde, 
attempted to commit mayhem upon Michael S. Terry 
by unlawfully and intentionally depriving 
Michael S. Terry of a member of his body, to wit: 
an ear, and/or by unlawfully and intentionally 
slitting the ear of Michael S. Terry, what now is 
your plea? Guilty or not guilty? 
TP at 4. See Addendum B. Although the Court made a finding that 
the guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made and that Mr. Velarde 
was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or suffered from a 
mental disability at the time he entered his plea, he did not make a 
finding that Mr. Velarde understood the nature and elements of the 
charge.2 Nor did the trial judge ascertain whether Mr. Velarde 
understood or make a finding that Mr. Velarde understood that the 
State had the burden of proving all elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt or the fact that the plea was an admission to all of the 
elements of Attempted Mayhem. Ld. Hence, the trial judge accepted 
the plea in violation of Rule 11(e)(4). 
Rule 11(e)(5) requires that the defendant know the 
possible sentencing consequences and that the trial judge make 
findings to that effect. No such findings were made in this case, 
and while the trial judge did inform Mr. Velarde that he could 
impose consecutive sentences, there was no discussion concerning the 
effect of a reversal of the murder conviction. As outlined in the 
2
 As discussed infra in subpoint 2 at 12, the affidavit 
Mr. Velarde signed does not outline the facts and therefore did not 
establish that Mr. Velarde understood the nature of the crime he was 
pleading to, the elements the State must prove, and the relationship 
of the facts in his case to that crime. 
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Statement of Facts at 1-2, Mr. Velarde entered his guilty plea to 
Attempted Mayhem believing it would have little impact on his 
sentence. Because the record does not establish that Mr. Velarde 
understood the full consequences of his plea, the trial court 
accepted the plea in violation of Rule 11(e). 
Because the trial judge accepted the plea in violation of 
Rule 11(e), good cause for withdrawal of the guilty plea existed, 
and the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Mr. Velarde's 
motion to withdraw his plea. 
2. The Warner-Brooks Test Requires 
Reversal of the Trial Judge's Denial of 
Mr. Velarde's Motion to Withdraw His 
Guilty Plea. 
In Vasilacopulos, this Court reversed the trial court's 
denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on 
the trial court's failure to establish that the defendant understood 
the possibility of consecutive sentences. J[cL at 94. This Court 
states that in Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court outlined a standard 
which required stricter compliance with the provisions of Rule 11(e) 
than the standard which had been followed in Warner, Brooks and 
Miller. Because Vasilacopulos entered his plea on February 17, 
1984, prior to the decision in Gibbons, this Court applied what it 
called the "Warner-Brooks test" and determined "whether the record 
as a whole affirmatively establishes defendant entered his plea with 
full knowledge and understanding of its consequences, namely the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences." 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94. When this Court reviewed the record 
- 13 -
as a whole, it determined that the record "does not affirmatively 
establish defendant's full knowledge and understanding of the 
consequences of his plea under Rule 11(e)(5).n J[d. at 95. 
Mr. Velarde entered his plea on January 24, 1984, 
approximately three weeks before Mr. Vasilacopulos entered his 
pleas. In the event Gibbons is inapplicable to Mr. Velarde's case, 
the "Warner-Brooks" review of the record as a whole test is 
nevertheless applicable. Applying that test to the entry of 
Mr. Velarde's plea of guilty of Attempted Mayhem establishes that 
the trial judge violated Rule 11(e) and the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment in accepting Mr. Velarde's plea. 
As outlined in subpoint 1, supra, the trial judge did not 
discuss with Mr. Velarde the constitutional rights he was waiving 
nor the nature and elements of the crime to which he was pleading 
guilty. A review of the affidavit signed by Mr. Velarde does little 
to remedy this deficit (see Addendum C). 
Rule 11(e)(4) and due process require that a defendant 
understand the nature and elements of the offense to which he is 
pleading guilty and the relationship of the facts in the defendant's 
case to the law. As previously outlined, the trial judge did not 
discuss with Mr. Velarde the elements necessary to prove Attempted 
Mayhem nor the specific facts in his case supporting such a 
conviction. Instead, the judge read the amended Information (R. 10, 
TP. 4), then asked Mr. Velarde for a plea. 
The affidavit does not establish that Mr. Velarde 
understood the elements required to prove Attempted Mayhem. In the 
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affidavit, under the "Elements" section, the following language was 
inserted: 
Def. (sic) attempted to unlawfully and 
intentionally deprive Michael S. Terry of a member 
of his body. 
(R. 16). The elements as listed in the affidavit do not clarify 
what act by the defendant is necessary to establish Attempted Mayhem. 
The lines in the affidavit where the facts should have 
been listed are blank (R. 16). Hence, the affidavit does not 
clarify what Mr. Velarde had done nor how those facts fit together 
in support of the charge. 
Mayhem is a somewhat unusual crime that requires specific 
egregious injury to the victim. The average person may well not 
understand the differences among Assault, a Class B misdemeanor; 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony; Attempted Mayhem, a third 
degree felony; and Mayhem, a second degree felony. Both the due 
process clause and Rule 11(e) require that a defendant be fully 
informed as to what he did and how that fits within the elements of 
the crime to which he is pleading. In this instance, the record as 
a whole does not establish that Mr. Velarde understood the nature 
and elements of the crime of Attempted Mayhem nor the nature of his 
actions in relationship to that crime. 
Nor does the record as a whole establish that Mr. Velarde 
understand the full consequences of his guilty plea. As previously 
outlined, the trial judge did not discuss the impact of a reversal 
of the murder conviction on Mr. Velarde's sentence nor does the 
affidavit clarify that point. Hence, the trial judge accepted the 
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plea in violation of Rule 11(e)(5). 
Nor does the record as a whole establish that the judge 
made the required findings under Rule 11(e)(3), (4) and (5), 
including the defendant's knowledge of the right outlined in 
Rule 11(e)(3), the defendant's understanding of the nature and 
elements of the crime to which he pled, and the State's burden of 
proof. 
Because the trial court accepted the guilty plea in 
violation of Rule 11(e) and the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, the trial judge abused his discretion in denying 
Mr. Velarde's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Velarde respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of 
guilty to Attempted Mayhem and remand the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 2. * day of December, 1988. 
s
~2&?<&^_^ C^2&^^ :> 
MANNY GARCIA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, MANNY GARCIA, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
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500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 and four copies to 
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Utah 84114 this ~x* day of December, 1988. 
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MANfcY GARCIA 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 THAT HE INDEED ADMITTED TO CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER, AS 
2 HE HAS ADMITTED IN THIS CASE TO ATTEMPTED MAYHEM THAT HIS 
3 CHANGING STATE OF MIND COULD BRING HIM BEFORE THIS COURT, I DON'T 
4 KNOW. BUT, THE OPERATIVE EFFECT TO SAY GIBBONS IS RETROACTIVE 
5 WOULD ESSENTIALLY VOID ANY GUILTY PLEA ENTERED INTO FROM GIBBONS 
6 I N THE STATE COURTS OF UTAH, AND SAY THIS I S TOO GREAT A LEAP 
7 OF FAITH FOR THE COURT TO DO. 
8 MR. GARCIA: AND SO I SUBMIT I T , JUDGE. I AM NOT TALKING 
9 ABOUT HIS CHANGE OF STATE OF MIND SO MUCH, BUT THE CHANGE OF 
10 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE ENORMOUS IN THIS CASE, AND FROM 
11 JERRY'S POINT OF VIEW, UNFORESEEABLE, FOR HE WAS NOT TOLD THAT 
12 THIS THING COULD BE THROWN INTO A BIG MESS I F THIS CASE IS 
13 REVERSED ON APPEAL AND GOES — ENTER A PLEA, HAS NOTHING TO DO 
14 WITH GUILT OR INNOCENCE AT THAT T I M E . 
15 I SUPPOSE THE STATE WAS READY TO GO FORWARD AT THAT 
16 T I M E , SO THEY SHOULD JUST — WE'RE ASKING HE HAVE A TRIAL ON 
17 THAT CHARGE NOW BECAUSE THE REASON THAT HE ENTERED THE PLEA 
18 IS NO LONGER REAL. 
19 THE COURT: I THOUGHT ABOUT THE RETROACTIVE - - ABOUT GIBBONS, 
20 BECAUSE I T WAS ABOUT F IVE YEARS AGO. HE ENTERED HIS PLEA - -
21 GIBBONS IS 1 9 8 7 , JUNE, SO THAT'S LAST YEAR. REVIEWING YOUR 
22 ARGUMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE COURT IS OF 
23 THE OPINION THAT THE MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED AT THIS TIME 
24 BASED ON STATE'S ARGUMENTS AND WITH REGARD TO RETROACTIVE AND 
25 THE CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING THE ENTRY OF THE PLEA AT THE T I M E . 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
•=20 'EARNS BUILDING 
SALT i.i-'z CITY UTAH 84101 
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ADDENDUM B 
2 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JANUARY 2k, 19$4 
9:30 A.M. 
—OO0OO--
THE COURT: JERRY LEE VELARDE? 
MR. VALDEZ: THAT'S MY MATTER, YOUR HONOR. THAT 
IS SET FOR A CHANGE OF PLEA. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED 
PLEA? 
MR. VALDEZ: PLEA TO A THIRD DEGREE, ATTEMPTED. 
THE COURT: ATTEMPTED MAYHEM? THIRD DEGREE, 
ATTEMPED MAYHEM? 
IS YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT NAME JERRY LEE VELARDE? 
MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU GONE OVER YOUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE WAIVER THEREOF AS SET FORTH IN 
YOUR AFFIDAVIT? 
MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS THAT 
YOU ARE WAIVING? 
MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: ANY QUESTIONS YOU WOULD CARE TO ASK 
THE COURT WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR THE 
WAIVER THEREOF? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
J 
THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE TO 
YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER A PLEA? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY PROMISES MADE AS 
TO WHAT THE COURT WOULD DO ON SENTENCING IN THIS CASE? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: HAS THERE BEEN ANY THREATS, DURESS OR 
ANY OTHER UNDUE INFLUENCE EXERTED ON YOU TO GET YOU TO ENTER 
A PLEA? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: BY ENTERING A PLEA TO THE INCLUDED 
OFFENSE, THAT CARRIES OF SENTENCE OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN 
THE UTAH STATE PENITENTIARY AND/OR A FINE NOT TO EXCEED 
$5,000. BY ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY, YOU DO, IN FACT, ADMIT 
THE ACTS THAT SUPPORT THAT CHARGE. 
HOW OLD ARE YOU? 
MR. VELARDE: 28, SIR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU READ AND WRITE THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE? 
MR. VELARDE: YES. 
THE COURT: HAVE HIM EXECUTE THE AFFIDAVIT. 
ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ANY 
DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU FEEL YOU HAVE ANY PHYSICAL OR 
4 
MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH YOUR FREE 
CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA? 
MR. VELARDE: NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY 
ENTERING A PLEA OF GUILTY AT THIS TIME? 
MR. VELARDE: YES. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. TO THE INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF ATTEMPTED MAYHEM, A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY AS I HAVE 
DESCRIBED IT TO YOU, WHICH OCCURRED AT 73 EAST <+00 SOUTH, IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON OR ABOUT MARCH if, 1983, 
IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 105, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THAT YOU, JERRY LEE VELARDE, 
ATTEMPTED TO COMMIT MAYHEM UPON MICHAEL S. TERRY BY 
UNLAWFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY DEPRIVING MICHAEL S. TERRY OF A 
MEMBER OF HIS BODY, TO WIT: AN EAR, AND/OR BY UNLAWFULLY AND 
INTENTIONALLY SLITTING THE EAR OF MICHAEL S. TERRY, WHAT NOW 
IS YOUR PLEA? GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY? 
MR. VELARDE: GUILTY. 
THE COURT: PLEA OF GUILTY IS RECEIVED, AND THE 
COURT FINDS THAT IT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE BY THE 
DEFENDANT, THAT HE IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ANY DRUGS, NARCOTICS OR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, NOR HAS A 
PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY AS SUCH THAT INTERFERES WITH 
HIS FREE CHOICE TO ENTER SUCH A PLEA. 
I BASE THOSE FINDINGS ON MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE 
5 
DEFENDANT HERE IN THE COURTROOM, TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS 
THAT WERE PUT TO HIM AND HIS RESPONSES THERETO. 
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED IN NOT LESS THAN 
TWO NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS. WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE? 
MR. VALDEZ: WE WOULD WAIVE THE MINIMUM TIME, 
YOUR HONOR, AND ASK YOU SENTENCE HIM TODAY. 
THE COURT: YOU UNDERSTAND, BY BEING SENTENCED 
TODAY, I WOULD COMMIT YOU TO THE PENITENTIARY? 
MR. VELARDE: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT 
YOU BE SENTENCED TO — ARE YOU OUT AT THE PENITENTIARY NOW? 
MR. VELARDE: YES, I AM. 
THE COURT: I NEGLECTED TO TELL YOU, THEN — I 
WASN'T AWARE OF THAT — I CAN ALLOW THAT TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY 
OR CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING 
OUT THERE. 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
MR. VELARDE: YES. 
THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU SERVING OUT THERE? 
MR. VELARDE: FIVE TO LIFE. 
THE COURT: IT WILL RUN CONCURRENTLY. I WILL 
SENTENCE YOU TO ZERO TO FIVE YEARS IN THE UTAH STATE 
PENITENTIARY. COMMITMENT WILL ISSUE FORTHWITH, AND I WILL 
ALLOW IT TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE FIVE TO LIFE SENTENCE 
YOU ARE PRESENTLY SERVING. 
MR. VALDEZ: THANK YOU. 
ADDENDUM C 
F D IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
State of Utah JAN 2 4 1984 
THE STATE OF UTAH. H. Dlxpn Hpllgj-Uerk 3ra Uist court 
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 0 Oeoutv Clerk 
Affidavit of Defendant 
Criminal No. 
I have received a copy of the charge (Jnformatij ) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
(Degree of Felony 
and understand the punishment for this crime may be 
Class of Misdemea; 
. prison term. 
?M^ V& ^fotfif 
. fine, or both . J am not on druj 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney 
who has explained my rights to me and 1 understand them. 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should 1 desire. 
2. 1 know that if 1 wish to have a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if 1 choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 
